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1. GENERAL WESTMORELAND INVITES COMMITTEE'S ATTENTION TO FOLLOWING:

QUOTE: A. ON 10 JANUARY 1968 AT 1530 HOURS, GENERAL WESTMORELAND AND LTG WEYAND CONFERRED, AND IN VIEW OF THE INTELLIGENCE CERTAIN OPERATIONS THAT HAD BEEN PROGRAMMED IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES OF III CTZ WERE CANCELLED.

LTG WEYAND WAS DIRECTED TO REDEPLOY HIS TROOPS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INTELLIGENCE AND TO MOVE THEM CLOSER IN TOWARDS SAIGON.

- B. ON 15 JANUARY 1968, GENERAL WESTMORELAND

 CALLED ON PRESIDENT THIEU AND SUGGESTED THAT THERE BE NO

 TET TRUCE. HOWEVER, PRESIDENT THIEU WANTED 36 HOURS AND

 AGREED THAT 50 PERCENT OF THE COMMAND WOULD BE PRESENT

 AND AT A HIGH STATE OF ALERT.
- C. ON 25 JANUARY 1968, AMBASSADOR BUNKER

 AND GENERAL WESTMORELAND CALLED ON PRESIDENT THIEU AND

 URGED THAT THERE BE NO TRUCE IN I CTZ. PRESIDENT THIEU

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AGREED.	1968, GENERAL			S
AGREED。 D. ON 30 JANUARY	1968, GENERAL OMMANDERS, FI	ELD FORCE C	OMMANDER	
AGREED. D. ON 30 JANUARY CALLED ALL COMPONENT CO	1968, GENERAL OMMANDERS, FI AN 100 PERCE	ELD FORCE C	OMMANDER	
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The state of the s	
1. FIRST VISIT	21 MARCH WAS TO IFF HQS IN NHA TRANG.
MG PEERS, CG, ATT	ENDED BRIEFING.
2. AS WE HAVE	FOUND ELSEWHERE, IFF HAD INTELLIGENCE
	OME SORT OF VC OFFENSIVE IN LATE JANUARY
•	
OR EARLY FEBRUARY	, BUT THIS INFORMATION DID NOT PIN DOWN
EXACT DATES AND S	COPE. BY AND LARGE IN II CORPS THE FOCUS
OF THREAT SEEMED	TO BE IN WESTERN HIGHLANDS.
3 。	IN CAPTURED
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
	T OF MAJOR ENEMY FORCES COULD BE FOLLOWED
WITH FAIR ACCURAC	Y. ON 5 JANUARY A DOCUMENT WAS PICKED
UP DESCRIBING PLA	NS FOR AN ATTACK ON PLEIKU. ON 25 JANUARY
IFF ALERTED ALL U	NITS TO PROBABILITY OF LARGE-SCALE
	NCTION WITH TET."
A. IN THIS COR	PS AREA, INFILTRATION INTO CITIES WAS
-19 TW THIE CON	
	ELY BY LOCAL FORCES AND SAPPERS, WITH
ACCOMPLISHED LARG	ELY BY LOCAL FORCES AND SAPPERS, WITH HELD OUTSIDE TOWN READY TO MOVE IN WHEN

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•	5. THE G-2 FELT H		TTH BOTH ROK	AND ARVN	
	WAS GOOD. GENERAL PE				
	WERE SOMETIMES RELUC				
(p	ARVN UNITS, EVEN VIA	UNITED STAT	ES CHANNELS,	BECAUSE C	F WHAT
,	KOREANS CONSIDER WEA	KNESS IN ARV	IN SECURITY.		
			NG IN WHICH HE	EMPHASIZ	ED
	WHEAT-AND-CHAFF PROB				
	WHO RECEIVE WEEKLY D				*
	ARE VALID. ALTHOUGH				
					S 1 3
		•	A 8 OF HIS NHA		
	(BEING POUCHED) A GE	NERAL IZED A	NALYSIS WHICH	COULD BE	
	APPLIED COUNTRY-WIDE	. IN GIST,	HE SAYS ERE SI	MPLY WAS	
	NOT ENOUGH INTELLIGE	ENCE TO INDI	CATE THAT A CO	ORDINATE	D
	AND SIMULTANEOUS ATT		the state of the s		
	OCCUR DURING TET PER				
			T MC STONE CO	з ДТН	
	7. TEAM THEN WENT				ALERT ON
12	US DIVISION, WHO EXI				
	A DECIN	T OF INTELLI	GENCE INDICAT	ING IMMIN	ENI
7	24 JANUARY AS RESUL				
**************************************	ATTACKS ON KONTUM,				

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r.	GE 3	DAIGUN	8024 D						
(F	ARA 3	ABOVE).						
	8. W	E NEXT	MOVED O	N TO PLEIK	U AND ARVN II	CORPS.			
Λ.(: A T M	D OC UME	NTS ANDE	RISONER IN	TERROGATIONS IN	NDICATED A			
	•								
C	MING	ATTACK	IN HIGH	LANDS. INT	ERROGATIONS OF	PRISONERS			
T	NDED	TO CON	FIRM THE	CAPTURED	PLEIKU ATTACK I	PLAN. ON			
25	JANE	JARY PL	EIKU WEN	TO AN AL	ERT STATUS AS I	NOTED IN			
P.	RA 3.	THIS	REQUIRED	ONE-THIRD	OF FORCE TO BE	EIN			
В	JNKERS	S AFTER	DARK. A	RVN ISSUED	AN ALERT MESS	AGE			
0	1 29 .	JA NUAR Y	. AT TIM	E OF ATTAC	K ARVN HAD TWO	DIVISIONS			
I	J II (CORPS A	REA AT F	ULL STRENG	TH AND TWO AT	HALF STREN	GTH		
		LEAVE							
<i>D</i>				አተሮሮ አዘተህሰ	RITIES FELT CO	OPERATION			
						.*			
A	10NG	INTELLI	GENCE SE	RVICES WAS	GOOD IN II CO	RPS AREA.	25		
	lø.		PLEA	ASE PASS TO	DIA AND J-3;				
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- 1. FIRST VISIT ON 20 MARCH WAS TO III CORPS HEADQUARTERS WHERE TEAM BRIEFED BY SENIOR ADVISOR, COL PETERS, AND G-2 ADVISOR, LC KIZIRIAN .
- 2. COLPETERS STATED OFFENSIVE WAS EXPECTED EITHER
 BEFORE OR AFTER TET. AS IN OTHER INSTANCES, NOTHING
 PINPOINTED EXACT NATURE OF ATTACK UNTIL 3Ø JANUARY WHEN A
 PRISONER SAID FOLLWOING DAY TAN SON NHUT, OTHER MILITARY
 INSTALLATIONS IN THE CORPS AREA AND SAIGON CITY WOULD BE HIT.
 ALERTING MESSAVES HAD ALREADY GONE TO ARVN FROM III CORPS,
 BUT ARVN TROOPS WERE AT ABOUT 5Ø PERCENT STRENGTH BECAUSE
 OF TET.
- 3. THERE WERE NO REPORTS FROM CIVILIANS PASSED TO THE III CORPS ADVISORS; BUT, AGAIN, POINT WAS MADE THAT THERE WERE NO MEANS OF COMMUNICATION ONCE VC HAD MOVED IN.
- 4. III CORPS FELT MOST SIGNIFICANT EARLY WARNING WAS REORGANIZATION OF VC COMMAND STRUCTURE IN THE CORPS AREA.

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5. BIEN HOA POINTED OUT THAT, WITH THE SITUATION

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PAGE 2 SAIGON Ø252 S E C R E T

AS IT WAS IN THE CORPS AREA BEFORE THE OFFENSIVE, CONTROL OF THE POPULATION WAS NOT THE SORT THAT ENCOURAGED PASSAGE OF INFORMATION. THERE ARE NOW 80 RD TEAMS IN PLACE AND 50 DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING CENTERS.

- 6. TEAM THEN VISITED II FIELD FORCE WHERE IT WAS
 BRIEFED BY COL FOULK, G-2. AS IN OTHER BRIEFINGS, COL FOULK
 STATED THAT ATTACKS WERE ANTICIPATED, BUT THE PRECISE FORM
 THEY WOULD TAKE WAS THE UNKNOWN FACTOR. THE FIELD FORCE
 WATCHED THE INDICATORS BUILD AND, ON 29 JAN, GEN WEYAND SENT
 A FLASH ALERTING MESSAGE WARNING ALL HIS COMMAND ELEMENTS
 THAT AN ATTACK ON FRIENDLY INSTALLATIONS COULD BE EXPECTED
 DURING THE NIGHT OF 29-30 JANUARY.
- 7. COL FOULK FELT HIS INTELLIGENCE WAS GOOD. HE REMARKED THAT ARVN III CORPS G-2 DID NOT BELIEVE AN ATTACK WAS IMMINENT.
- 8. TEAM NEXT WENT TO CAN THO FOR A IV CORPS BRIEFING.

 MG ECKHARDT, SENIOR ADVISOR, ATTENDED. IN THE BRIEFING IT

 WAS POINTED OUT THAT THERE HAD BEEN INDICATIONS SOMETHING

 WAS BUILDING AS EARLY AS OCTOBER WITH NO SPECIFIC INDICATION

 OF THE TARGETS. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THERE IS NO REAL

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25X1		CAPABILITY IN THIS	CORPS AREA.	
	9. AS WAS THE C	ASE IN III CORPS, ARV	N WAS CELEBRAT	ING
	TET AND WAS WELL UN	DER STRENGTH.		
	10. IT WAS NOTE	D HERE, AS IT HAS BEE	N ELSEWHERE, T	HAT
	THE CIRCUMSTANCES W	ERE NOT THE SORT THAT	ENCOURAGED CI	VILIAN
	REPORTING IT WAS	TET; THE NUMBER OF S	TRANGERS IN T	Æ
	VILLAGES WAS NOT UN	USUAL (FOR YEARS VC)	HAVE COME INTO	TOWN
	FOR THE CELEBRATION	NS, SINGLY AND IN GROU	JPS - ON FOOT A	AND IN
	SAMPANS); AND ONCE	THE VC MOVED, IT WAS	DIFFICULT AND	
25X1	DANGEROUS FOR ANYON	NE WHO MIGHT BE WILLIN	NG TO REPORT TO	DO SO.
23/1	11.	CAN THO BRIEFING IT	WAS AGAIN NOT	ED
	THAT ARVN WAS FAR I	FROM READINESS. THERE	E WAS A DISCUS	SION
25X1	OF ASSETS, S	SOME OF WHICH HAD PROD	DUCED GENERAL	
	WARNING IN ONE	INSTANCE A GROUP OF	VC SAPPERS WER	E 25X1
	ROLLED UP AS A RESI	JLT OF OPERATION	ONS.	
	12. IV CORPS U	NITED STATES COMPONE	NTS ARE NOW	
	ORGANIZING AN INTER	LIGENCE COORDINATING	CENTER AT CAN	Т НО
25X1	BASE.		_	25X1
Stocker where cour	13.	PLEASE PASS TO DIA AN	D J-3;	
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1	. TEAM VISITE	O III MAF,	ARVN I CORP	, PROVIS	IONAL,	
C OR	PS VIETNAM, ANI	REGION I	ON A	ARCE E	BIEFING	
III	MAF WAS CONDU	CTED BY LG	CUSHMAN AND	STAFF, I	NCLUDIN	G
MG	ROBERTSON, CG	I MARDIV.				
2	2. IN SUMMARY	, GENERAL	CUSHMAN FELT	HE HAD A	MPLE	
F ORE	EWARNING; WAS	ABLE TO KE	EP UP WITH M	OVEMENTS	OF HOST	ILE
ELEN	MENTS, AND ACT	ED ACCORDI	NGLY. ALL A	GREED THA	T, ASID	E
FROM	1 DANANG, SPEC	FIC VC TA	RGETS WERE N	OT KNOWN,	ALTHOU	gн
T HEF	RE WAS A GREAT	DEAL OF I	NTELLIGENCE	INDICATIN	G SOMET	HING
WAS	COMING AROUND	TET. GEN	ERAL CUSHMAN	NOTED TH	AT ATTA	CKS
ON C	CITIES WERE EXP	ECTED. D	EFENSE FORCE	S HAD BEE	N	
POSI	TIONED, HOWEVE	R, TO DEA	WITH DIRECT	T ATTACKS	(FORCES	5
WERE	STATIONED ABO	OUT 3 KILO	METERS OUTSI	DE CITIES)。	
INFI	LTRATION WAS N	OT ANTICI	PATED ON THE	SCALE US	ED BY TH	łE
VC.						25X1
3	S. AS FOR DANA	NG, IT HAI	BEEN CLEAR	FOR SOME	TIME,	
			ТНАТ ТНЕ	CITY WOU	 וו פר דע	

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